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There are a few postdictive perceptual phenomena known, in which a stimulus presented
later seems causally to affect the percept of another stimulus presented earlier. While
backward masking provides a classical example, the flash lag effect stimulates theorists
with a variety of intriguing findings. The TMS-triggered scotoma together with “backward
filling-in” of it offer a unique neuroscientific case. Findings suggest that various visual
attributes are reorganized in a postdictive fashion to be consistent with each other, or
to be consistent in a causality framework. In terms of the underlying mechanisms, four
prototypical models have been considered: the “catch up,” the “reentry,” the “different
pathway” and the “memory revision” models. By extending the list of postdictive
phenomena to memory, sensory-motor and higher-level cognition, one may note that
such a postdictive reconstruction may be a general principle of neural computation,
ranging from milliseconds to months in a time scale, from local neuronal interactions to
long-range connectivity, in the complex brain. The operational definition of the “postdictive
phenomenon” can be applicable to such a wide range of sensory/cognitive effects across a
wide range of time scale, even though the underlying neural mechanisms may vary across
them. This has significant implications in interpreting “free will” and “sense of agency”
in functional, psychophysical and neuroscientific terms.
Keywords: postdiction, flash lag, TMS, causality perception, hindsight, free will, sense of agency
INTRODUCTION
This paper will review postdictive phenomena in perception and
cognition, mainly from the author’s own work with his collabora-
tors but from some classical studies as well, to discuss the impli-
cations of these works. The first part of the paper will introduce a
number of classical examples of “backward perceptual phenom-
ena” (section Backward Perceptual Phenomena), as well as the
flash-lag effect and its variations as more modern examples (sec-
tion Flash-lag Effect, its Variations, and Object Updating). These
phenomena will clearly suggest that there is a limited temporal
time range (on an order of 100–200ms) within which the process-
ing of a stimulus presented later can affect the percept of another
stimulus presented earlier. Starting from here, we will extend
our review and discussion into several different directions. One
unique contribution of ours is the TMS-triggered scotoma and
the backward filling-in, which provide us with some insights into
how cortical signals are dynamically reorganized (section TMS-
Induced Scotoma, and Backward Filling-in). These may provide
an empirical basis upon which to explore schematic prototypes of
possible mechanisms (section Underlying Neural Mechanisms?).
We will further extend our list of postdictive phenomena to (a)
the memory and sensory consequences of voluntary movements
(section Extending the “postdiction” Concept to the Memory and
the Sensory Consequences of Voluntary Movements), to discuss
neural and computational mechanisms further (section Neural
and Computational Considerations), as well as (b) “hindsight
bias” and cognitive reconstruction for consistency, at even longer
time scales (section Hindsight Bias, and Cognitive Consistency).
Whereas the underlying neural mechanisms in these cases may be
different from the more sensory phenomena, the operational def-
inition, the functional significance, and computational structure
at an abstract level, of the “postdictive phenomenon” may still
hold.
In the last few sections, we will further extend our discussion to
Benjamin Libet’s well-known claims, and the “free will” as endan-
gered (section Libet’s Claims, and the “free will” Endangered?).
We will consider “sense of agency” as a postdictive attribution
and an authentic illusion, as a solution to this contention (sec-
tion “Sense of agency” as Postdictive Attribution and an Authentic
Illusion).
This paper is not meant to be an inclusive overview of back-
ward phenomena in general (in the context of prediction vs.
postdiction to cope adaptively with neural delay, see Bachmann
(2013) for a systematic overview.) Rather, it aims to focus on the
variety of phenomena at a wide range of time scales, to discuss
possible underlying mechanisms as well as philosophical/real-
world implications.
BACKWARD PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENA
There are a few classical perceptual phenomena in which a
stimulus presented later seems causally to affect the percept of
another stimulus presented earlier. (To avoid ambiguity, “seems
to” above means “seems to scientists,” and “percept” means the
“percept to the observer.”) We would like define “postdiction”
or “postdictive perceptual phenomena” as such, throughout this
paper. For example, a masking stimulus that is presented later
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can suppress the visibility of a target that is presented earlier in
physical time (backward masking; see Figure 1).
Kolers and von Grunau (1975, 1976) examined the “color
phi” situation. The stimuli are similar to those for the classical
apparent motion (“phi”; Figure 2I), except that the two stimuli
(snapshots) are colored differently (e.g., green and red). Their
observer tended not to see a smooth change of colors, but instead
saw an abrupt change of the color at one point, in the trajec-
tory (Figure 2II). However, Kolers and von Grunau (1976) also
reported that a shape version (with two distinctively different
shapes in the two frames) works better (Figure 2III). In this
case, a quick yet smooth morphing of contours/shape can be
observed, which is clearly different from the color case. Moreover,
this observation seems to hold even in the abrupt, one-shot
presentation, as opposed to repeated presentations of the same
sequence.
The one-shot observation case is more stringent and intrigu-
ing particularly when there is no clue or knowledge is given as
to where and what is given in the second frame. In fact, even
the most classical case of apparent motion should be consid-
ered postdictive under such a condition, as quite logically, the
smooth trajectory of motion should be constructed only after
the information about the second stimulus is given. Indeed, we
have demonstrated that even in a condition in which the appar-
ent motion can be leftward or rightward randomly across trials,
the perception of apparent motion is no less obvious and/or
smooth than the repeated case. Moreover, by adding an addi-
tional probe dot around the spatio-temporal trajectory of the
apparent motion, we demonstrated that re-ordering of the tem-
poral sequence of events occurs along with the spatio-temporal
trajectory of motion (Nadasdy and Shimojo, 2010).
Examples are not limited to vision. In the cutaneous modal-
ity, the most well-known form perhaps would be the “cutaneous
FIGURE 1 | Forward masking (left) and backward masking (right).
Space (X) × time (T) plot of the stimulus sequence and effects. Under
appropriate conditions (<100ms), a presentation of a mask prevents the
target from being visible. The backward case, in particular, pauses a paradox
in the framework of single-line, or feedforward (“Cartesian”) model of time.
rabbit” effect (Geldard and Sherrick, 1972; see Figure 3). The
cutaneous stimulus sequence is composed as the following for this
demonstration; three tap stimuli are presented sequentially on an
armwith temporal intervals equal but locations different (e.g., the
first and second stimuli at the same location, and with the third
then jumps, as shown in Figure 3). In effect, the second tap is
mislocalized in the direction of the third.
These and other backward perceptual phenomena are mostly
established at phenomenological and experimental levels. They
obviously impose a hard problem on any interpretations based on
the “a one-directional, single arrow” analogy of time, along which
only an earlier event causally affect another subsequent event.
One may call this the “Newtonian” model (or “Cartesian theater”
after Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992); see the same for a theoret-
ical review of the postdictive phenomena). In neural processing
terms, the model may be characterized as strictly feedforward.
When one considers the mental time, however, this would be
an unnecessarily strong, and inappropriate, analogy to the phys-
ical time. As will be suggested later (section “Sense of agency” as
Postdictive Attribution and an Authentic Illusion), the perceptual
sequence of two perceptual events (as the content of percept, in
the Mind Time) should be strictly separated from the physical
sequence of corresponding neural events (in the Brain Time: see
Figure 6). In other words, the strict isomorphism is not guaran-
teed to hold in the microscopic temporal domain (as analogous
to no direct isomorphism hold between spatial perception and
spatial relationship of neural activity in the brain). We will revisit
to detail this point later (section “Sense of agency” as Postdictive
Attribution and an Authentic Illusion).
FIGURE 2 | Classical apparent motion, and variations. The stimuli and
percepts are illustrated on the left side, with the graphs on the right side
shows space (X) × time (T) sequences of the stimuli and the percept. In the
classical “phi” (I), a pair of target separated within the optimal range of
space and time distances lead to a percept of a smooth continuous visual
motion. The colored phi (II) according to Kolers and von Grunau (1975,
1976) leads to an abrupt change of the color as well as the position. The
shape variation (III) (Kolers and von Grunau, 1976) leads to a smooth
impression of shape morphing, and seemingly works even under an
one-shot presentation without prior knowledge or a cue.
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FIGURE 3 | Cutaneous rabbit (Geldard and Sherrick, 1972). Numbers in
the figure indicate the temporal sequence of tapping stimuli on the arm
(with 40–200ms equal intervals). A spatial interpolation occurs in this
case—that is, the location of tap 2 is biased toward that of tap 3. Note that
the event subsequent in time (3) causally affects the perceived location of
the prior event (2).
There is yet another line of perceptual phenomena which are
closely related to the backward phenomena, and indeed yielded
the concept of “postdiction” via debates concerning the underly-
ing mechanisms—that is, the flash-lag effect and variations of it,
as discussed next.
FLASH-LAG EFFECT, ITS VARIATIONS, AND OBJECT
UPDATING
Consider a smoothly moving object with yet another flashed
object. Even when the flashed one is vertically aligned in its
position with the moving object, the moving object tends to be
mislocalized ahead in the direction of the motion (Figure 4I).
This is called the “flash lag effect” (Nijhawan, 1994). The ini-
tial interpretation was that the brain predicts along the motion
trajectory, to compensate its own neural processing delay by per-
ceiving it ahead (but only for the moving stimulus, not for the
flashed stimulus which is harder to predict). This was consistent
with other circumstantial evidence that the brain compensates for
its own delay (e.g., Changizi et al., 2008). However, a variety of
other hypotheses/theories have been proposed to account for the
effect, and none have been conclusive thus far (for a review, see
Nijhawan, 2002).
What is critical in the current context is the following counter
intuitive fact: the “flash terminated” case, where the moving
and the flashed object disappear at the same time (Figure 4II),
does not yield the effect (that is, the location of the flashed
object is not mislocalized). The “flash initiated” case, on the
other hand, where the two objects appear at the same time,
with one continuing to move while the other disappears imme-
diately, as “flashed” (Figure 4III), yields the effect (Nijhawan,
2008). Obviously, it is counterintuitive in any views of the effect
based upon the predictability of the position of the moving
target from its prior trajectory. To account for such a retro-
spective modulation of conscious visual perception, Eagleman
and Sejnowski (2000) proposed a “postdiction” mechanism in
which the percept attributed to the time of the flash is a
function of events that occur in a timewindow of a maxi-
mum 80 milliseconds after the flash. Also note, with regard
to the main theme of this paper, that they consider the post-
dictive process as a mechanism to yield visual awareness, or
a conscious percept (beyond the mere operational definition
of the “postdictive phenomena”; section Backward Perceptual
Phenomena).
Figure 4IV illustrates “generalized flash lag” effect (Sheth et al.,
2000). The sustained object did not move its position, but instead
was smoothly changing in terms of one visual attribute such as
color (or luminance, size, or spatial randomness, for instance),
and another object is briefly flashed with a color which matches
the changing object’s color at that moment. In the example illus-
trated in the figure, the flashed yellow is perceived simultaneously
as the orange color of the color-changing object. The effect is
structurally similar to the classical flash-lag in the space/position
domain; that is, a color of the changing object subsequent to
the moment of presentation is perceived as simultaneous with
the flashed. It is also critical to note the asymmetric pattern of
results, similar to that in the classical flash lag effect—that is, the
generalized flash lag tends to occur when the second half of a stim-
ulus movie is presented (starting from the flash of the target; the
“flash initiated”), but not when it is terminated there (the “flash
terminated”).
It may be fair to say that there are some “non-postdictive”
accounts proposed for the flash lag effect, and specifically the flash
terminated case. For example, one may rely on the alleged extra
neural delay (from the stimulus onset to the onset of conscious
perception) of the suddenly-flashed object relative to the moving
object (e.g., Whitney and Murakami, 1998). This account may be
generalized to any sorts of smooth stream of an object represen-
tation with an abrupt onset of another object, thus possibly to
the generalized flash lag effect. However, the mere fact of different
neural delay may be somewhat dubious (seeMoutoussis and Zeki,
1997; Nishida and Johnston, 2002). Moreover, the situation seems
to be a bit more complicated, and other factors such as whether
stimulation comes in stream or flashed plays a role (Bachmann,
2010, 2013; Bachmann et al., 2012).
Either way, the postdictive account of the flash lag effect, espe-
cially of the flash terminated case is worth mentioning here, for
several reasons. First, it may be considered the original case of
the term “postdiction” specifically employed to describe the ret-
rospective modulation of visual awareness. Second, along with
our strictly operational definition of the postdictive phenomena
(section Backward Perceptual Phenomena), a physically subse-
quent event (of the moving object) affects the perceptual (spatio-
temporal) relationship between it and another flashed object.
Therefore, the neural delay accounts should be considered “non-
postdictive” mechanisms which are still proposed to account for
the postdictive (flash-lag) effect (operationally defined). Third,
this is a rich perceptual phenomenon with a wide range of
variations where a physical spatio-temporal sequence of visual
stimuli leads to a percept of different sequence, thus providing
ample opportunities to investigate underlying mechanisms of the
phenomena postdictive.
One may still wonder what relationship the phenomena
described so far have to the idea of “object updating” by James
Enns et al. The object updating framework may be considered
the closest to the idea of postdiction and related phenomena
which are outlined here. A closer comparison may reveal similar-
ity as well as the current implications beyond those of the object
updating.
Object updating refers to the process whereby recently sam-
pled information is integrated with an existing representation of
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FIGURE 4 | Flash lag effect and its variations. In the classical (or the
“complete”) case by Nijhawan (1994) (I), a flashed target appears to be lagged
relative to a smoothly moving one. In the case of “flash terminated” where the
motion trajectory after the presentation of the flash target is eliminated (II),
there is no flash-lag effect observed. Finally, in the case of “flash initiated”
where the motion trajectory before the flash target is eliminated (III), a
qualitatively similar and nearly a full amount of the effect can be observed
(Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000; Nijhawan, 2008). This is unexpected from any
account relying on the role of the prior trajectory (and extrapolation/expectation
from it). (IV) Illustrates the “generalized flash lag” effect (Sheth et al., 2000).
The sustained object did not move its position, but instead smoothly changing
in one visual attribute such as color (or luminance, size, spatial randomness,
etc.), and another object is briefly flashed with a color which matches the
changing object’s color at the moment. In the illustrated example, the flashed
yellow is perceived simultaneously as the orange color of the color-changing
object. (Modified from Sheth et al., 2000, Figure 1.)
a scene, resulting in an updated version (e.g., Lleras and Moore,
2003; Lleras and Enns, 2004; Moore and Enns, 2004). They argue
that this theoretical framework provide a more comprehensible
account for a variety of effects, such as the object substitu-
tion masking (especially the Negative Compatibility Effect, or the
NCE), and the flash lag effect, etc.
The negative compatibility effect (NCE) is the surprising find-
ing that visual targets that follow a brief prime stimulus and a
mask can be identified more rapidly when they are opposite rather
than identical to the prime. This was originally taken to reflect a
competition between inhibitory unconscious processes and exci-
tatory conscious processes (Klapp and Hinkley, 2002). However,
Lleras and Moore (2003) offered an alternative account based
on the object updating. If the perceptual processing interacts
between the prime and the mask features, these seemingly neutral
masks may, in fact, act as strong positive primes for the features
that are not shared between prime and mask, they argue.
Likewise, the object updating may provide an alternative
account especially for the classical, and some special variations
of the flash lag effect (Nijhawan, 2008), where a smoothly mov-
ing object appears to be ahead in its trajectory, relative to a
simultaneously flashed another object. The effect occurs when the
moving object continues following the flash, but is eliminated if
the object’s motion path ends with the flash, as described above
(the “flash terminated”). In the object updating framework, this
may be interpreted as proving the necessity of updating the object
representation after the flash. It seems to be consistent with the
postdictive account of the effect, but with a somewhat different
emphasis.
Whereas the object updating emphasizes the distinction
between a representation of new object vs. that of the same
object with feature changes, the postdictive construction view
emphasizes that the content of conscious percept (e.g., the spa-
tial alignment judgment of the two objects in this case) is a
postdictive construct at an implicit level. The critical phenomeno-
logical observation here is that the updated representation is
“experienced” as a percept, but “referred back” in time to the
original moment of focus. It will be clearer especially in the
case of the postdictive phenomena in a longer time scale (sec-
tion Extending the “postdiction” Concept to the Memory and
the Sensory Consequences of Voluntary Movements), but iso-
morphically true in nearly all the cases dealt in the current
paper.
The object updating theory seems to be relatively limited to a
short time range within several hundred ms or so, and to only a
handful of visual effects, as mentioned above. The critical ques-
tion raised in the section Extending the “postdiction” Concept
to the Memory and the Sensory Consequences of Voluntary
Movements and the subsequent sections will be whether the
postdiction framework, while highly consistent with the object
updating, will offer a more inclusive (or at least continuous) list of
phenomena over-arching a much wider range of time scale, from
teens of ms (at the level of sensation) to months (at the level of
long-term memory and cognition).
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TMS-INDUCED SCOTOMA, AND BACKWARD FILLING-IN
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is an intriguing tech-
nique which is used to stimulate or to suppress visual cortical
activity, without stimulating the retina with a light. It is intriguing
specifically in the current context because when using it, one may
investigate how the direct manipulation (activation/suppression)
of the visual neuronal activity can interact, and be integrated with
the retinal signals.
We demonstrated that an artificial and temporal scotoma can
be created by a combination of a visual stimulus and a single-
pulse TMS (Kamitani and Shimojo, 1999). In each trial, there
was a fixation point on a gray background, and a large-field
grid stimulus was presented briefly (40–80ms). After a vari-
able delay, a single-pulse TMS was applied to the occipital scalp
(Figure 5I). When the delay of the magnetic stimulation was
within 67–200ms, the observer typically reported a scotoma, i.e.,
a gray homogenous patch in the hemi visual field contra-lateral
to the TMS (Figure 5II). The phenomenology was qualitatively
common and reliable across participants. We could even ask them
to draw a gray-filled elliptic patch by adjusting its size via amouse.
Figure 5II shows an example of an actual data set obtained that
way. The results in five trials within a participant with a fixed delay
were superimposed, in order to show the across-trial reliability of
the effect.
In a subsequent experiment, we maintained the stimulus
sequences, but changed the color of the background: there was
initially a red(green) background for 5 sec, then a black-and-
white stripes for 80ms., and finally green(red) background for
5 s (Figure 5III). (A two-dimensional grid was used in the first
experiment, whereas stripes were used in this experiment. As a
result, the scotoma was compressed along the orientation of the
stripes, which is not essential given the current context.) With
FIGURE 5 | TMS-induced scotoma, and backward filling-in. (I) Stimulus
sequence. After the participant fixated at a fixation point, a large-field patterned
stimulus was presented for a brief time period (40–80ms depending on the
experiment), followed by a single-pulse TMS applied to the scalp over the
primary (and possibly the secondary) visual cortex. The participantwas asked to
report the phenomenological size, shape and location of the TMS-induced
scotoma bymanipulating themousewith a computer graphics software. (II)An
example of actual data set. Results, graphics drawings of the scotoma in five
trials within a participant with a fixed delay were superimposed, in order to
show across-trial reliability of the effect. (III) Backward filling-in. The sequence
of stimulus presentation, and also the result, i.e., averaged color chosen across
the participants, were illustrated for “a red background (5 s)→BW stripes
(80ms)→ a green background (5 s)” sequence (top row of the figure), and “a
green background→BW stripes→ a red background” sequence (bottom row).
The colors filled in the scotoma in this figure are bothwhat the participants have
chosen on average. (Modified from Kamitani and Shimojo, 1999, Figure 5.) (IV)
Backward filling-in: schematic diagram to summarize the finding in a Space ×
Time diagram. When local visual signals were suppressed creating a scotoma,
the scotoma was filled-in with the color of the subsequent background,
backwards in time (as indicated by the black arrow). In effect, then, the filled-in
color and the surrounding striped pattern were perceived simultaneously, even
though they were given to the retina subsequently in the physical time.
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this design, we tried to address the following question—why did
we perceive the gray-filled scotoma filled gray in the first exper-
iment? Was it because all of the color selective neurons were
equally suppressed by the TMS (hypothesis 1: the “broken color
TV” hypothesis), or merely because the background in the cor-
responding retinal region was occupied by gray as a part of the
preceding background (hypothesis 2: “forward filling-in” hypoth-
esis)? The participant’s task in this particular experiment was to
report the filled color inside the scotoma by pointing and click on
a continuous color scale showing a smooth transition from a pure
gray to the most saturated red (green).
The results betrayed both of the hypotheses above, as shown
in the figure (Figure 5III). The colors in the scotoma in the
upper and the lower row of the figures were the actually selected
color, averaged across the participants. Thus, when the subse-
quent background was green (the preceding was red; the upper
row), a green-filled scotoma resulted. When the subsequent back-
ground was red (the lower), it then was red-filled. Thus, a sort of
“backward” filling-in seemed to occur.
Figure 5IV schematically summarizes the result. When a local
region of the topographical map of the visual field in the early
visual cortices was suppressed by the TMS, the corresponding
region in the grid/stripe pattern was perceived as a scotoma. The
scotoma, however, was filled backward from the subsequent back-
ground color (indicated by the black arrow); thus, the stimuli
presented only sequentially on the retina (i.e., the grid pattern and
the subsequent background color) were perceived simultaneously
in the particular spatial configuration (i.e., the elliptic scotoma in
the large BW-patterned field). The filling-in is “backward” in this
limited sense.
According to our informal observations, qualitatively identical
results can be observed when we replaced the colored back-
grounds with textured ones (although colors were the easiest to
identify and thus to report). Therefore, the backward filling-in is
a general phenomenon, not specific to color. When a part of the
topographical representation was lost (by the TMS with a delay
shorter than 200ms), the visual cortex automatically utilizes the
latest input in the particular region (the scotoma) at the moment
and fills it in. This is consistent with our findings of the TMS-
triggered replay of a visual stimulus (Wu and Shimojo, 2002,
2004; Halelamien et al., 2007; Vasudevan et al., 2009), indicating
that content of a conscious percept is determined by the interplay
of the retinal input and the internal state of the visual cortex at
the moment.
Since this is a very special case with TMS, not with regular reti-
nal inputs, it may not be appropriate to include it in the list of
the “postdictive visual phenonena.” Indeed, one may account for
the backward filling-in effect strictly relying on the instantaneous
effect of the TMS on the visual cortex, as opposed to the neural
conductance delay from the retina to the primary visual cortex, in
the vicinity of 80–100ms minimally. But even so, this may still be
considered a special case of the “catch up,” as described as the first
prototypical neural model of the postdiction mechanism in the
next section Underlying Neural Mechanisms?. Moreover at the
very phenomenological level, the background color (or pattern)
in the scotoma area is perceived as “simultaneous” as the sur-
round target pattern, which is qualitatively different from the
temporal sequence of the visual stimuli. This is consistent with the
operational definition of the postdictive phenomena. The TMS
and retinal inputs are interactively compromised to yield a sta-
ble spatial percept (for instance, the shape of the scotoma is filled
in and thus squeezed along the direction of background stripes;
Kamitani and Shimojo, 1999), and this is reminiscent of the case
of “smooth pursuit mislocalization” which will be described in
section PursuitMislocalization, and Effects of the Spatial Context.
The set of findings with TMS allows us a glimpse into the
dynamic process of integration to yield a postdictive effect at the
early cortical levels within a 100–200ms time window. Although
in the previous examples of visual postdiction phenomena there
was no direct stimulation/suppression of the visual cortical activ-
ity, a qualitatively similar process may operate during the dynamic
reorganization of inputs. Overall, these findings indicate that
dynamic, and at least partly postdictive processes are involved in
the neural mechanisms yielding visual awareness, or a conscious
percept.
Before moving on further to extend our list of postdictive phe-
nomena to a more macro timescales, we would like to consider
what prototypical neural/psychological mechanisms are conceiv-
able as candidate underlying mechanisms (next section).
UNDERLYING NEURAL MECHANISMS?
We have reviewed backward phenomena using our own defini-
tion at sensory/perceptual levels. It may be the time to consider
what alternative we have, in terms of possible neural mechanisms.
Albeit schematic, we can list some, as illustrated in Figure 6.
External (environmental, or physical stimulation) Time, Brain
(neural/physiological) Time, andMind Time are represented sep-
arately in these diagrams. The oblique arrows denote neural
conductance delays (the more oblique from the vertical direction,
the slower).
A remark may be necessary here, with regard to the distinc-
tion between the Brain Time and the Mind Time. “Mind Time”
will be used as a short name for “mental representation of the
temporal events.” Most of scientists naively assume that the Brain
Time defines the Mental Time, and thus equate them, which the
author cannot agree. A perceptual sequence of events, as a con-
tent of a percept, should be logically dissociated from the physical
sequence of neural correlate events which caused them. When an
event A is perceived prior to another event B (“A→B”), such a
stream of percept (“A→B”) should also have a neural correlates.
The neural correlates, however, does not have to be in the form
such that there are two dissociable neural events corresponding
to A and B respectively, nor that they are in this physical sequen-
tial order [the neural event(A) → neural event(B)], although
such one-to-one mapping between the perceptual events and the
neural events may be found at the peripheral or the lower-level
visual representations. This point may not seem to be necessary
in this section, but the significance will be clearer when we argue
against the “first-order isomorphism” in the temporal domain
and Benjamin Libet’s view later (section Libet’s Claims, and the
“free will” Endangered? and “Sense of agency” as Postdictive
Attribution and an Authentic Illusion).
The first intuitive option is the “catch up” model (Figure 6I).
It has been accepted that the same retinal input may arrive at
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic diagrams of possible mechanisms. External
(environmental) Time, Brain (neural/physiological) Time, and Mind Time are
represented separately. (I) The “catch up” model. Different speeds of neural
signal conductance were expressed by fanning arrows, for each of the
sensory events (A and B). Under certain conditions, fast neural signals
coming from the physically subsequent event (B) may catch up slow neural
signals from the prior event (A) to causally affect its perceptual consequence,
as indicated in the red circle. (II) The “reentry” model. Feedforward signals
from the cortical level 1 are sent back from the higher level 2 to the level 1,
thus enables contextual effects from both surrounding and subsequent
stimuli. (III) The “different pathways” model. The identical stimulus can
generate two distinctive output responses A (an elaborated percept) and B
(typically a motor action), each of which is mediated by two different
pathways. Cortical pathways are typically (but not always) considered the
“slow and conscious” whereas subcortical pathways are often considered
the “fast and subconscious.”
the primary visual cortex with various timings, and the same
may be applied to the lower and upper levels of the visual hier-
archy in general. Thus, a fast signal of a physically subsequent
stimulus B may catch up with a slow signal of a stimulus A to
affect the percept of it causally (e.g., the visibility of it, as in the
case of backward masking; Breitmeyer and Williams, 1990), as
indicated in the red circle in the figure. The slow and the fast
signals have been associated with either X and Y channels, or sus-
tained (P) and transient (M) channels (e.g., Breitmeyer, 1993)
in terms of the neural implementation. It may appear confusing
to some readers because this model solely based on feedforward
pathways, yet claimed to be a potential account for postdiction.
Note once again that throughout this paper, the definition of the
postdictive phenomena is strictly operational (section Backward
Perceptual Phenomena), and the proposed mechanism can be
either feedforward like this, or re-entry (as the next model) which
can be considered postdictive at the implementation level, or
even more explicitly postdictive as the Benjamin Libet’s model
(as will be described in section Libet’s Claims, and the “free will”
Endangered?).
Figure 6II denotes an alternative idea (“reentry”), which
assumes vigorous feedback from a higher level to a lower level
of the visual information processing hierarchy. It is such feedback
pathways that enable various sorts of contextual effects, includ-
ing some postdictition (as indicated by the thick blue and green
downward arrows) and even conscious awareness (Lamme, 2001;
Fahren fort et al., 2007). This may allow more room to account
for paradoxical causal perception, as will be described later (sec-
tion Spatial Memory Updating with Perception). Both the “catch
up” and the “reentry” models have been entertained especially for
the backward masking and the flash lag.
The third option (“different pathways”) heavily relies on the
known dichotomy of two visual pathways (ventral vs. dorsal,
“what” vs. “where” or “cognition” vs. “action”; Goodale and
Milner, 1992). This scheme is meant to explain dissociative, or
selective deficiency in patients, as well as differences between
explicit and implicit measures (such as reflexive reaction times
vs. elaborated, conscious perception; e.g., Vorberg et al., 2003).
However, it can also be applied to account for some of the seem-
ingly paradoxical, postdictive phenomena, as will be described
later (Neural and Computational Considerations). For a real-
world example, competitive 100m sprinters often report that
their legs start moving even before their conscious awareness
of the starter’s pistol sound. It can be interpreted with mul-
tisensory prior entry, i.e., a difference in neural delay in dif-
ferent sensory-motor pathways, such as auditory→motor vs.
motor→kinesthetic. If so, this actually reflect a rare failure in the
ordinary postdictive reconstruction process of causality, as “the
pistol sound triggeredmy leg reaction,” thus allowing us a glimpse
into what is normally occurring a the implicit level, before the
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postdictive process operates (we will be back again to a similar
real-world example in section Libet’s Claims, and the “free will”
Endangered? and Figure 10II). Given that this model incorpo-
rates global pathways/connectivity aspects of the brain, it may
have more flexibility to account for paradoxical causality like this.
As the fourth option, we can add the “memory revision”model
(Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992), in which a tentatively estab-
lished memory representation may be revised later. The object
updating idea (described in section Flash-lag Effect, its Variations,
and Object Updating) may be considered a specific example of it.
This model may be more appropriate for the phenomena with
a longer time scale, as will be described in the next and the
subsequent sections.
These concepts exemplify the prototypical ideas of mecha-
nisms underlying various sorts of postdictive phenomena. They
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, especially because some
tap into existing neural mechanisms while others emphasize more
hypothetical, theoretical structures. More recent models may
be considered as hybrids. For example, Bachmann’s (2013)“per-
ceptual retouch” model seems to have incorporated both the
“reentry” and the “different pathway” ideas. Likewise, the fourth
model, i.e., the revision of memory, may be involved more or less
in all the other models (although it depends on the definition of
“memory”) because those inevitably refer to some neural repre-
sentation of sensory input, which may be called memory (albeit
very iconic, or short-term). The distinction between perception
and memory may be important when one discusses neural imple-
mentation, but it will be made less important when we will
extend this review to a longer time scale because of the similar-
ity and the continuity in function and abstract structure (section
Extending the “postdiction” Concept to the Memory and the
Sensory Consequences of Voluntary Movements and Hindsight
Bias, and Cognitive Consistency).
What is also noteworthy here is that some of these models
(especially the first and the third) are rather conservative, in that
temporal sequence of the relevant neural events can directly deter-
mine and thus be “read out” as the perceived order (and in some
cases causality) of the perceived event. Thus once again, “non-
postdictive” (such as the “catch up” and the different “pathway”)
models as well as “postdictive” neural implementations (such as
the “re-entry”) can potentially offer alternative accounts for the
“postdictive” phenomena in its operational definition.
For the rest of this paper, we will every now and then refer back
to these diagrams. When we discuss the relevance of Benjamin
Libet’s claims, especially the “backward referral” claim, we will
point out some potential problems related to “the first-order iso-
morphism” between the Brain and Mind Times, that is implicitly
assumed particularly at microscopic time scales in these models
(with the possible exception of the memory revision model). A
more intriguing possibility based on a strict distinction between
perceived timing as a content of perception vs. its physical timing
of its neural correlates, will be introduced.
Thus far, we have discussed about vigorous postdictive reorga-
nization in the time scale of hundreds of milliseconds, whereas
now we will include memory updating and perceptual reor-
ganization on a time scale of one to several seconds (section
Extending the “postdiction” Concept to the Memory and the
Sensory Consequences of Voluntary Movements), as well as
higher cognitive functions including hindsight in visual explo-
ration/detection, and the postdictive reconstruction of causal
attribution in long-term memory, where the relevant time scale
will range from minutes to days (section Hindsight Bias, and
Cognitive Consistency).
The extension of our list of postdictive phenomena into the
longer-time scale, and memory will have two implications. First,
it will point to the possibility that the postdiction may be a very
general principle from sensation to cognition to memory, and
with time delays from tens of millisecond to months of time
delay (Neural and Computational Considerations). Second, it
will make it more feasible to consider visual awareness as extra-
short (iconic) visual memory, which is phenomenologically and
structurally continuous to short-term memory. For an intuitive
example, consider a “percept” of flickering light. It is directly “per-
ceived” as such, but some form of memory is logically necessary
“to perceive” it.
EXTENDING THE “POSTDICTION” CONCEPT TO THE
MEMORY AND THE SENSORY CONSEQUENCES OF
VOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS
Perceptual events are constantly consolidated into memory, but
the transition process is not precisely akin to simply creating
a Xerox copy. Instead of faithfully duplicating the perceptual
structure at the time, it rather reorganizes the event sequence
in accordance with various principles, such as information com-
pression, better Gestalt, consistency with regard to the relevant
context, and a causal framework, etc. Wu et al. (2009), for exam-
ple, demonstrated that a flash that actually caused reappearance
of the target stimulus in awareness (after having been “sublim-
inated” by motion induced blindness, Bonneh et al., 2002) was
itself consciously perceived as appearing later than the reappear-
ing target. Thus in this case (as many other cases dealt with
in the current paper), perceived temporal sequence of the two
events are detached and inconsistent with the physical causality.
Note that the “catch up” model (in section Underlying Neural
Mechanisms?) may suffice to explain the illusory temporal order,
but a conscious percept may require more, including causal
attribution at least in some cases. Wu et al. (2009) prefer the
reentry model to explain, but there may be another account
feasible based on a neural delay difference and a distinction of
specific/nonspecific processes (Bachmann and Aru, 2009).
This type of backward cognitive reorganization has been
reported repeatedly in cognitive and social psychology. For exam-
ple, F. C. Bartlett in his classical study (1932) used American
Indians’ folktales as materials to recall, which may appear illog-
ical or unrealistic to average Westerners, in a recall experiment.
Recalled stories by British participants (students) revealed some
distinctive eliminations, re-ordering, and biases to make the sto-
ries more consistent and logical. In their seminal series of studies,
E. F. Loftus and her group (1979) demonstrated that witnesses’
memories of an accident can be biased by the way of ques-
tions/instructions and by the context and episodic memory of
recall itself. Memory was reorganized mainly for consistency,
information compression, and ease to of retrieval in these cases.
In some cases it can be interpreted just as a simple confusion on
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temporal sequence, but in most cases, the causal interpretation
or even a revision of the content of memory is involved. Similar
causal misattribution/memory modification has been observed
when one is asked for “intention” of action as the cause of a move-
ment (as will be mentioned again in section “Sense of agency” as
Postdictive Attribution and an Authentic Illusion).
Memory reorganization of this type is commonly known,
but the current question is as follows—Could the same type of
postdictive reconstruction of memory occur at a much lower
sensory-motor level, and in a much shorter time scale? If such
a case exists, then it would bridge the gap between the back-
ward perceptual phenomena (reviewed in the previous sections)
and memory, raising the intriguing theoretical possibility that the
postdictive construction be a general neural-cognitive principle
that governs from lower sensory to higher cognitive processes,
from micro to macroscopic time scales.
SPATIAL MEMORY UPDATING WITH PERCEPTION
In Figure 7I (revised from Sheth and Shimojo, 2000), a target
dot undergoes a smooth translational motion at a constant speed
from the left to the right on a CRT display. When it disappears, a
tone plays with either a high or a low pitch randomly. Depending
on the tone pitch, the participant in the experiment was asked to
report either the initial, or the final position of the target respec-
tively, by moving the cursor and clicking the button as soon as
possible. The stimuli and the task were as simple as such, except
for one critical aspect that is, a random dot texture, which moved
either downwards or upwards randomly, was added to the display.
FIGURE 7 | Memory updating with perception (Sheth and Shimojo,
2000). (I) Stimulus configuration. While the participant maintained eye
fixation, the target moves horizontally. Due to the background dot pattern
movement (either upwards or downwards), it appeared to move in an
oblique direction (called “Duncker illusion,” or induced motion). Upon the
stimulus offset, the participant localized either the target’s initial or the
final positions (depending on a tone cue given at that moment) by
pointing and clicking with a mouse cursor. (II) Response (the initial
position estimation) expected in the case of a full postdictive
reconstruction. Since the participant was more certain about the exact
location of the final position of the target, and also since the oblique
trajectory of movement due to the illusion was so compelling, we
hypothesized that the participant would bias the memorized position of
the target at onset, in the direction consistent with the illusory trajectory
(as shown in the diagram). (III) As the results, vertical and horizontal
localization errors were plotted. Each dot represents a single trial. The
length of the rectangle indicates the standard error of the initial and the
final localizations, respectively. As can be seen from the figure, the final
position was deviated relatively little (right), but the initial position was
biased opposite to the illusory bias of the motion trajectory, as expected
(left). The differences in localization error between the initial and the final
positions were highly significant, in terms of both accuracy (P < 10−7)
and directional bias (p < 10−30; N = 7). (Figures are modified from Sheth
and Shimojo, 2000, Figures 1 and 2.)
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Due to the well-known “Duncker illusion,” a target that phys-
ically moved horizontally appeared to move obliquely upwards
(the red arrow in Figure 7I; against the background dots mov-
ing downwards) or obliquely downwards (against the background
upwards). Would the memorized initial position be affected by
this illusory bias of the trajectory? More specifically, would the
bias of the initial location be in a direction that was more con-
sistent with (1) the final position which should be the latest and
thus more accurate visual signal, and (2) the perceived (illusory)
direction of the trajectory (as illustrated in Figure 7II)?—These
were the critical questions that we raised with this paradigm.
Figure 7III shows the results Sheth and Shimojo (2000). As
expected, the errors in the final positions were relatively small
(right), but the initial positions (left) were biased significantly in
the direction consistent with that of the perceived trajectory and
the final position. Because the participants had learned quickly
via the practice and in the initial trials that they would be asked
for the initial position with a 50% probability, it can be assumed
to be a trivial cognitive strategy for them simply to memorize
the initial position as accurately as they could at the outset in
the each trial. In the result, the bias was substantially smaller
than what expected from a complete compensation to be consis-
tent with the perceived trajectory, but it was significantly above
zero.
Several control experiments revealed further that: (a) making
known the nature of the illusion, or (b) making the trajectory of
target motion much more irregular and complicated (to mini-
mize a straightforward, conscious and logical inverse calculation),
did not significantly reduce the bias. Moreover, (c) reducing the
latency of the response (i.e., allowing the subject to respond
immediately when they saw the beginning of the target motion)
reduced the bias substantially, but not completely.
This type of spatial memory updating has two significant
implications, at least. First, as emphasized previously, it indicates
a constant updating process ofmemory when faced with real-time
sensory inputs. Second, it may indicate the “revising” of causal
perception, albeit implicitly. That is, the initial location, the tra-
jectory, and the final location are reorganized in amore consistent
causal framework of perception in this case. Thus, it may share
implications with several other studies concerning causality per-
ception. For examples, on top of Wu et al. (2009) that is described
in section Extending the “postdiction” Concept to the Memory
and the Sensory Consequences of Voluntary Movements, Choi
and Scholl (2006) demonstrated that visual events can deter-
mine whether a collision is perceived in an ambiguous situation
even when those events occur after the moment of “impact”
of the putative collision has already passed. Thus, the findings
overall indicate a vigorous automatic tendency of updating short-
term memory to be consistent with on-line perceptual inputs,
even at this simplest and lowest sensory level. This immediately
raises a related question as to whether this type of postdic-
tive reconstruction occurs only in positional information, or
whether it may occur in any other visual attributes, such as shape
or color? The logical expectation, especially from the “general-
ized flash lag” observation (section TMS-induced Scotoma, and
Backward Filling-in), would be the latter because there is noth-
ing intrinsically special about position in this case (i.e., dynamic
reconstruction). Albeit inconclusive, we do have some evidence
consistent with this expectation as described in the next section.
PURSUIT MISLOCALIZATION, AND EFFECTS OF THE SPATIAL CONTEXT
Pursuit eye movement on a smoothly moving object leads to a
mislocalization of the target that is briefly presented nearby dur-
ing the pursuit (Mitrani andDimitrov, 1982). To bemore specific,
the direction of mislocalization is in the direction of the pursuit
movement (Figure 8IA). What if there is an obstacle (a continu-
ously present static object) in the trajectory of the mislocalization
(Figure 8IB)? It would be inconsistent if the brain has a spatial
representation in which it has to carry the location of the flashed
target along the translational trajectory. How would the brain
resolve such an inconsistent situation? This was the motivation
of the experiments (Noguchi et al., 2007). Directly extending the
implications of the previous study (with the Duncker illusion, in
the previous section), one may hypothesize that the visual sys-
tem pursues a more consistent interpretation of spatio-temporal
events, modifying the natural tendency of the pursuit-caused
spatial bias. Figure 8IC illustrates one variable, which is the
position of an obstacle relative to that of a flashed target, and
Figure 8IIA shows the results where the positional errors are plot-
ted against the relative positions. Essentially, the mislocalization
was “stopped” by the obstacle, but only if it is within the trajectory
of the mislocalization. Likewise, when the obstacle was indeed in
the trajectory of the mislocalization but only partially covering
the length of the flashed target (Figure 8III), the perceived mis-
localization is consistent with it in terms of the shape and the
position of the mislocalized target in the spatial representation
(Figure 8III).
More intriguing was when the obstacle had a different color
(e.g., red) from that of the flashed target (green). As shown in
Figure 8IV, a color mixture resulted. Note that while the color
perceived was a mixture, that the mixed hue itself was never pre-
sented to the retina, which should be considered very convincing
evidence for integration of signals within a temporal window.
Note that the differently-colored obstacle needed to be located
in the direction of the mislocalization (Figure 8IVA), not else-
where (B). This effectively eliminates the possibility of any local
aftereffect.
A related observation was made in the flash lag circumstance,
where a red target was flashed exactly on top of a green object, for
instance. This would yield an yellow percept due to color mixture
normally, but when the green object underwent a smooth motion
(either rotational or translational), the red flash was mislocalized
and at the same time seen qualitatively very close to the origi-
nal saturated red (Nijhawan, 1997). Therefore, in this case, color
decomposition instead of color mixture (of the retinal inputs)
occurred. What is common between these two cases, the smooth
pursuit mislocalization and the flash lag, is that the color per-
ceived was seemingly consistent with the perceptual localization,
as opposed to the retinal.
In the study of pursuit-driven mislocalization, we also manip-
ulated the timing of the obstacle with regard to that of the
target. The results (Figure 8V) suggested that the reorganiza-
tion of the shape and the color were maximal when the obsta-
cle was presented in the “post” period (i.e., having the same
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FIGURE 8 | Saccade mislocalization, and effects of spatial context
(adopted from Noguchi et al., 2007). (I) The main experiment. (A) The
basic effect of the pursuit mislocalization. The black arrow indicates the
direction of both the target’s (black) movement and smooth pursuit eye
movement, while the white arrow indicates the mislocalization effect. (B)
The main experimental configuration where a static “obstacle” was
present in the trajectory of mislocalization throughout the trial. (C) Four
different locations of the obstacle, as the main variable. (II) Results.
Position errors (deg.) are plotted for the spatial conditions of the
obstacle. The solid and dotted rectangles indicate the location of the wall
in each condition. As can be seen, the position errors were the largest
in the low condition (with no significant reduction), then smaller in the
far, the middle, and the near conditions in this order. This was exactly
what should be expected from the topographical “spatial representation”
idea. (III) Manipulations to partially occlude the trajectory zone (A),
phenomenological results (B), and more quantitative results plotted as
length (C) and position (D) of the perceived target. (IV) Color mixture.
The two stimulus configurations/ sequences employed (A,B), and the
results in the CIE xy color space (C,D) were shown. As can be seen in
(C), the colors were mixed into a subjective yellow. As can be seen in
(D), the color mixture effect was much larger in the “right wall”
condition (A, where the obstacle was located right in the middle of the
trajectory) than the “left wall” (B, where the obstacle was behind it). (V)
Effect of timing. We compared four different timing conditions: (a) Pre,
(b) During (the flash target presentation), (c) Post (during + after), and (d)
Pre + Dur. In the partial occlusion (“a hole”) variation (A), the effect of
blocking the mislocalization was largest in the Post condition (B). In the
color mixture variation (C), the mixture effect was maximum also in the
Post condition (D,E). (Reproduced from Noguchi et al., 2007, Figures 1,
2, 3, 6 and 7, with permission from ARVO.)
onset as the flash, but lasting longer after the flash offset), rel-
ative to the “pre,” “during” or “pre and during” periods. This
suggests that the “carrying over” mechanism for the localiza-
tion of the flashed target operates beyond the duration of the
flashed target itself, and that the presence of the obstacle inter-
feres with it in the critical time zone. Nonetheless, the resulting
consistent features (i.e., positions, shapes and colors) are percep-
tually “backward-referred” to the moment of the flashed target—
backward-referred because it is phenomenologically not the case
that the original positions/colors/shapes are perceived first, and
then re-perceived asmodified. Rather, all of those “reconstructed”
features are perceptually given as a one-shot, immediate percept
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from its onset of appearance. The similarity to the flash lag
(especially the “flash initiated” case) should be obvious.
Thus, the postdictive reconstruction occurs in not only the
position, but rather in various visual attributes including, the
shape and color (and even the temporal order). Together with the
generalized flash lag effect (section Flash-lag Effect, its Variations,
and Object Updating) and the memory updating results with
the Dunker illusion (section Spatial Memory Updating with
Perception), in terms of postdictive processing the position is not
special. Rather, all the concurrent visual feature information is
dynamically and iteratively processed to reach a consistent scene
interpretation at the given moment.
NEURAL AND COMPUTATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Here, we would like to reconsider the possible mechanisms (sec-
tion Underlying Neural Mechanisms?), but this time with more
explicit references to specific neural mechanisms, with additional
computational thoughts especially in the extended time range.
As mentioned in section Underlying Neural Mechanisms?,
varying speeds of neural signal conductance even within the
same pathway (say, from the retina to the V1 via the LGN) are
well established (e.g., “Parvo” vs. “Magno” pathways; Livingstone
and Hubel, 1988), providing the basis of the “catch up” idea
(Figure 6I).
More recent advances in neuroscience implicate reentrant sig-
naling as the predominant form of communication between brain
areas, and this idea may help us to understand the neural corre-
lates of visual awareness, in situations such as backward masking
(Di Lillo et al., 2000). To be more specific, they identified two
masking processes both of which are based on reentrant signal-
ing. One is an early process that is affected by physical factors
such as adapting to luminance, and the other is a later process
that is the masking by object substitution. Iterative reentrant pro-
cessing, when formalized in a computational model, provides a
more comprehensible account of all forms of visual masking than
do the long-held feedforward views based on inhibitory con-
tour interactions. Along this line, V. Lamme and his colleagues
revealed that the EEG derivatives that are typically associated with
reentrant processing were absent in the masked, as opposed to
non-masked, condition (Fahrentfort et al., 2007; although there
is a notable objection, e.g., Põder et al., 2013). A study employing
TMS with the metacontrast paradigm suggests that a prior visual
stimulus can influence subsequent perception at the early stages
of visual encoding via feedback projections (Ro et al., 2003).
In the context of “blind sight,” there is substantial evidence in
favor of the theory that unconscious visuo-motor transforma-
tions, as in the blindsight, are executed in an entirely feedforward
processing cycle, while visual awareness is critically dependent
on feedback connections to the primary visual cortex (Lamme,
2001).
These findings make reentrant signaling as a good candidate
for the postdictive phenomena described thus far in this paper
(Figure 6II), for a variety of reasons. First, the reentrant feed-
back is appealing intuitively in the sense that an earlier (in both
the temporal sense and the visual information processing hier-
archy) visual representation is “revised” by the feedback from a
higher level. Second, the distinction between the implicit vs. the
explicit processes may nicely map onto the feedforward/feedback
distinction (as shown in the case of blind sight above). Last but
not the least, such reentrant signaling may in principle occur
from very short-ranges (such as different layers of the visual
cortex, or neighboring visual areas such as V1 and V2) to very
long-ranges (such as occipito-frontal and occipito-temporal con-
nections). This last point is especially significant in the current
paper, which aims to find a common thread in various postdictive
phenomena, across very different temporal and neural scales.
Finally, the idea of two major, dissociable visual streams has
been presented. Whereas Mishkin et al. (1983) characterized the
ventral and the dorsal pathways “what” vs. “where,” Goodale and
Milner later modified as “cognition” vs. action with new patient
data. This provided the basis for the “different pathways” idea
(Figure 6III).
From a more computational viewpoint, at least some of
the postdictive phenomena may be understood in the Bayesian
framework, where the conditional probability indicates signal-to-
noise ratio in the visual input while the prior probability may be
encoded in the prior internal state of the relevant brain region.
Indeed, a similar attempt to account for the rabbit and some other
postdictive effects in the Bayesian framework has been made ele-
gantly (Goldreich and Tong, 2013). It is also consistent with the
general implications from the TMS studies (reviewed in section
TMS-induced Scotoma, and Backward Filling-in) in which a con-
scious percept reflects both the retinal input (as a likelihood) and
the internal neural state (as a prior). More specifically, some addi-
tional (potentially arbitrary) assumptions may be necessary to be
consistent with the findings. The occurrance of the scotoma itself
is due to a local disruption of topographic representation of the
retinal input (i.e., a local blockage of the likelihood). There is evi-
dence that the TMS locally suppresses the retinotopic mapping
of the visual field on the surface of the visual cortex (Kamitani
and Shimojo, 1999) so this assumption is reasonable. Then, the
backward filling-in may simply reflect the brain’s tendency to rely
heavily on the prior (whichever information internally available at
the critical moment) when the likelihood is locally not available or
very noisy. The Bayesian may provide an overarching framework
to more explicitly formalize the postdictive phenomena across
the wide range of time scale (from sensation, to perception to
cognition).
The idea concerning “compensation of a neural delay by
extrapolation” in the flash lag (Nijhawan, 1994) may also be con-
sidered in this framework, where expectation or prediction (or
a “set” in a higher cognitive term) is implemented in the inter-
nal state (as suggested in Berkes et al. (2011) and de Lange et al.
(2013), for example).
As for the big picture, more complex brains have more reen-
trant connections, thus enabling Bayesian-like complex decisions,
postdictive reconstructions, and possibly “awareness.”
HINDSIGHT BIAS, AND COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY
As mentioned above, there is a rich source of evidence of cog-
nitive reorganization for consistency, information compression,
and ease of recall. In the social science literature, a similar effect
is known as “hindsight bias.” Hindsight bias is the tendency to
retrospectively think of outcomes as being more foreseeable than
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they actually were. It is a robust judgment bias and is difficult
to correct (or “debias”). It has been demonstrated in historical
events as well. For example, people retrospectively overestimated
how well they could predict the restoration of US-China relations
during the period of Nixon’s surprise visit to China, as opposed
to their actual predictions during the visit. So this is a cogni-
tive postdiction phenomena in a large time scale, where people
tend to implicitly “revise” their memory on prediction in the
past under the influence of the outcome. (The study on athelete’s
“sixth sense” which will be described in the next sub-section is
also in the same format).
Hindsight bias may explain the cognitive gap between those
who are accused vs. those who accuse them in a medical law
suit or after a more large-scale disaster such as a nuclear plant
accident, because the accusers accuse the accuses always based
on their retrospective, thus postdictive, estimation of how much
prediction was possible on the disastrous outcome, only after it
occurred. The author and his colleagues became interested in a
situation in which one who was informed regarding a problem
situation tended to overestimate how much an uninformed could
perform a perceptual task. In the experiments, we used a visual
paradigm in which performers decided whether blurred pho-
tos contained humans, while the image was progressively made
sharper (Figure 9I; Wu et al., 2012). Evaluators, who saw the pho-
tos unblurred (visually primed) or verbally primed thus knew
the correct answer (a human present/absent), estimated the pro-
portion of participants who would guess whether a human was
present at a given degree of defocus. The evaluators exhibited
visual hindsight bias, i.e., an overestimation of judgment perfor-
mance by the uninformed participants (the data not shown; Wu
et al., 2012), but only with a visual priming, not with a verbal
priming. It can be again considered a form of cognitive post-
dictive bias because the known answer (presence or absence of
a human) substantially affects the estimation of the task diffi-
culty before knowing the correct answer (although in this case the
estimation was on some others’ performance, not the informed
own). The data qualitatively and structurally matched earlier data
on judgments of historical events surprisingly closely. Using eye
tracking, we further showed that a higher correlation between
the gaze patterns of performers and evaluators (shared attention;
as indicated in the heat map in Figure 9IIa) is associated with
lower hindsight bias in the stimuli with humans (Figure 9IIb).
This association was validated by a causal method for debiasing:
showing the gaze patterns of the performers to the evaluators as
they viewed the stimuli progressively reduced the extent of hind-
sight bias, as indicated in two different measures of performance
change (Figure 9III).
The study suggests that task difficulty/performance is often re-
constructed retrospectively. The exact neural mechanism under-
lying such long-term cognitive hindsight bias would be different
from that which underlies perceptual backward phenomena on
the microscopic time scale. Nonetheless, the similarity in the
results between these types of visual and the historical tasks indi-
cate, at a functional level, that they may reflect a general intrinsic
tendency of the brain to learn from experiences but exclusively in
the cognitive format of “cause and effect” such that it can be used
for adaptive predictions in the future.
AN ATHLETE’S “SIXTH SENSE”?
For a further investigation of this type of postdiction, i.e., the
re-construction of events into a cause-effect format in a more
controlled way, and how such an automatic tendency overcomes
the natural tendency to be consistent with one’s own past deci-
sions, we decided to examine athletes’ “sixth sense” as to how well
they predict they would do in the next game/match. Athletes in
various sports, including top professionals and amateurs, often
claim that they can tell whether they will be a hero or not in the
next game/match, but is that a real prediction based on some
implicit self-assessment of one’s physiological and mental con-
ditions, or simply a postdictive construction (which can occur
when the question is raised only after the game or match)? We
asked over 100 college and high school athletes in a variety of
sports [volleyball, soccer, basketball, and Kendo (Japanese fenc-
ing)] to fill out a questionnaire in the morning before an actual
game or match later in the day (Kadota et al., 2009). The question
of our interest was embedded in other ordinary questions about
their mental and physical conditions, their teamwork, etc., asking
“How do you think you will perform today?” (Prediction). We
then repeated a similar set of questions, including another ques-
tion of our interest, “How did you think you would perform this
morning?” (Postdictively-reconstructed prediction).
Virtually the same question was repeated within the same day
within subjects, thus it should have been easy for the participants
to notice their own inconsistency. Nonetheless, more than a half
of the athletes who participated changed their prediction in the
postdictively reconstructed case. Moreover, those who lost tended
to make their changed predictions more negative, whereas those
who won tended to make them more positive. The tendency of
interaction was highly significant (p < 0.005). On the other hand,
neither the predictions before the game, nor answers to other
questions (such as mental and physical conditions), nor physio-
logical measures (such as body temperature, hear rate, and blood
pressure) did accurately predicted the performance, according to
a path analysis performed later. The overall pattern of the results
went against the natural tendency to be consistent when answer-
ing the postdictive question with the memory of the predictive,
strongly indicating a robust tendency at an automatic and implicit
level, of postdictive reconstruction to be consistent with the actual
outcome. Such automatic and implicit characteristics thus hold
generally, from the sensory to the more cognitive levels.
REAL-WORLD IMPLICATIONS
These studies described above have obvious social-scientific
implications because the hindsight bias can be a cause of vari-
ous sorts of conflict in employer-employee relationship, sports,
medial lawsuits, and even international affairs. It may even cast
a doubt on some “scientific” studies in other fields. For example,
millions of dollars of federal science budget have been spent in
China, Japan and various European countries to explore the pos-
sibility of “predicting” massive earthquakes from certain “signs.”
An intuitive part of the motivation behind this came from anec-
dotal reports of observations such as abnormal animal behavior
or natural phenomena (such as unusual shapes of clouds or an
extra bright sunset, etc.) as a possible precursor to the disaster.
The fundamental problem with these reports, needless to say,
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FIGURE 9 | (I) Hindsight; procedures. The task instruction was the following:
“An imagewasgettingsharper.Decide if there isahumanASAP.”Theperformers
just had to do this task, whereas the evaluators had to evaluate “proportion of
performers said human (present)” with a visual, or a verbal priming. (II) A
comparison of eye movement patterns and task performance. (a) The top raw
shows an example of “low correlation” between the performer’s and the
evaluator’s gaze patterns as heat maps, with the stimulus and original (clear)
photo image. The bottom raw shows an example of “high correlation” stimulus.
(b) Median hindsight biases plotted for each conditions (stimuli with/without
humans). Black bars show the result of least similar (lowest correlation)
quartile, while gray bars show that of most similar (highest correlation). “∗”
Represents statistical significance between xxx (p < xx). (III) Howmuch
debiasing effects were obtained are shown either with (left) or without (right)
gaze pattern information of the performers. Two different quantitative
measures (RMSE and linear bias) of bias produced similar results. Black
bars denote stimuli with humans, whereas gray bars denote stimuli without.
“∗” Represents statistical significance from zero (p < 0.05) (reproduced from
Wu et al., 2012, Figures 1, 3 and 4, with permission from Assoc. Psychol Sci.)
is that those episodes were collected only after the earthquake
with no exception, making them highly susceptible to postdictive
biases. Formalistically, the conditional probability of such a large
earthquake to occur, given such an “unnatural” sign reported in a
post-hoc fashion, should be compared with a conditional proba-
bility calculated via daily (prior) observations; that is, given a pre-
designated unnatural sign in one morning, what was the chance
that a major earthquake would occur later on that day (or a pre-
defined short time period). The latter type of data would be very
difficult practically to collect (because it would require enormous
amount of time and resources), and perhaps may never exist.
What did we learn thus far in this review? First, there are vari-
ous cases in the perceptual domain in which a conscious percept
is based on some integration process in a limited temporal time
window (of approximately 100–200ms), within which a stimulus
presented later can seemingly affect causally how the subsequent
stimulus is perceived. Second, conscious perception can thus be
equated to a sort of “ultra-short-term” (iconic) memory, except
that against the classical concept of a passive, faithfully duplicated
but fainting copy of the original input, this process should be con-
sidered to be a very dynamic reconstruction from a sequence of
sensory inputs. Third, there are several prototypical mechanisms
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conceivable, such as the “catch up,” the “reentry,” the “differ-
ent pathway,” and the “memory revision” models, each of which
has reasonable behavioral/neural evidence behind it. Fourth, the
structurally similar postdictive reconstruction seems to occur as
well on a much larger temporal scale, in the domain of retrospec-
tive causality attribution and the postdictive reconstruction of a
prediction, which may characterize complex brains.
Regarding the last remark, we have used the term “recon-
struction” repeatedly, but it is not meant to imply the repeated
experience of the conscious percept itself. Instead, the reconstruc-
tion process may be postulated in the following way. In the first
implicit stage, there may be a faithful representation of a physical
event sequence at earlier implicit levels of information processing.
It is only at the later levels, a downstream of the information pro-
cessing or along a different pathway, where a conscious percept
is constructed (for the first time) such that it is more consis-
tent with a context including the subsequent stimuli and a causal
framework of cognition.
This last point should be taken seriously, as it implies both the
presence of an implicit, automatic predictive process, as well as a
reconstructive, postdictive process for conscious perception.
LIBET’S CLAIMS, AND THE “FREE WILL” ENDANGERED?
Benjamin Libet made several important observations and claims
which are highly relevant to the central thesis of the current paper,
i.e., postdiction (Libet, 2004).
The first of these involves his simple observations with a train
of electric pulses to stimulate the somatosensory cortex of the
human patients. He observed that a sensation generated by a
weak electric pulse (just above the threshold) can be suppressed
“backwards” by a train of pulses applied with a 200–500ms delay.
If the initial stimulus is repeated within a several-second inter-
val however, a cutaneous sensation is rather facilitated by the
same subsequent train pulses with the same 200–500ms delay.
The relevance of the observations is obvious because these are
considered to be another example of postdiction, but this is
more related to the TMS example above (section TMS-induced
Scotoma, and Backward Filling-in) because in both cases, a direct
neural intervention causally affects the percept of a stimulus pre-
sented earlier (although the former case is in vision, while this is
in the cutaneous modality).
Second, in the same setup with direct current stimulation,
he claimed that some implicit neural process precedes conscious
perception, yet the onset of the conscious percept is perceptu-
ally “referred backwards” to the stimulus onset. He also pointed
out that the first peak of the evoked potential recorded from the
somatosensory cortex is a good candidate for the time marker, to
which the backward referral occurs (Figure 10I).
Along this line, Nishida and Johnston (2002) recently re-
examined Moutoussis and Zeki’s observation (1997) of the asyn-
chrony of color and motion percepts, arguing that the perceived
timing of a sensory event should be strictly distinguished from the
objective, physical timing of its neural correlates. To be more spe-
cific, they argue that even if the critical neural process of a visual
attribute (say, color) is faster than another attribute (motion), it
does not necessarily require that the former (color) appears ear-
lier than the latter (motion) in the perceived sequential order. It
is because the perceived sequence is the content of the percept in
FIGURE 10 | Benjamin Libet’s findings on postdictive process, and
backward referral. (I) Time marker for the backward referral. The first peak
of the evoked electric response from the primary somatosensory cortex is
quick, temporarily locked to the stimulus onset, and present even when the
stimulus is below the sensory threshold. Thus, it could be a good candidate
of the time marker, to which the backward referral of the sensation caused
by the sustained cortical activity occur. (Modified from Libet, 2004.) (II)
Libet’s functional account of the backward referral in the real world. The
figure illustrates time sequences of external and mental events in 500ms
or so. When a driver hit the break because (s)he saw a small boy running
into the road ahead of his/her car, his/her conscious report of the event
sequence would be exactly in this order (as illustrated in red in the top raw).
However, what actually happened with regard to the implicit and explicit
levels of his/her mind would be different. It was rather likely that his implicit
sensory-motor pathway had triggered the brake immediately (within 150ms
or so; as indicated by the gray dashed arrow), even before he was
consciously aware of the presence and the content of the sudden object,
i.e. the boy (as indicated at the top right). According to Libet, this scenario
is well supported by a variety of laboratory evidence indicating presence of
implicit and fast sensory-motor pathways. Thus, the backward referral
process put the sequences of events into concise, cognitive frameworks
such as causality and “intention of action.” (Modified from Libet, 2004.)
the Mind Time (in Figure 6), whereas the neural event sequence
is in the Brain time. This critical distinction logically allows a
room for Libet-type backward referral, and resolves its seemingly
paradoxical (or even “anti-scientific” to some) appearance. By the
same token, it effectively eliminates a “homunculus,” a mysteri-
ous Brain-Mind enigma who is sitting at the “brain center” to
judge whether event A (color) or B (motion) occurs first. The
same may apply to other postdictive phenomena, especially in the
sensory-perceptual domain within 100 or 200ms.
Libet’s third claim concerns action. His findings on “prepara-
tory potentials” suggest that there is specific neural activity that
precedes and causally determines the execution of an action, in
the order of several hundreds of millisecond. He also developed
his own unique psychophysical paradigm in which a participant
evaluated the timing of the onset of a conscious intention toward
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an action preceding its execution. Overall, he argued that the
neural activity precedes and causes both the intention and the
execution of action.
Why do we need such a complex process as backward refer-
ral? Moreover, how could we integrate his three claims into a
general framework? Libet offers a functional account. He uses a
real world example. The Figure 10II illustrates time sequences
of external and mental events occurring within approximately
500ms or so. When a driver hits the breaks because he sees a
small boy running into the road ahead of his/her car, his conscious
report of the event sequence would be precisely in this order (as
labeled in red). However, what actually happened with regard to
the implicit and explicit levels of his/her mind would be differ-
ent. It was rather likely that his implicit sensory-motor pathway
had triggered the brake immediately, even before he was con-
sciously aware of the sudden appearance of the boy (as indicated
at the bottom as External time line). This is akin to the other real-
world example that we used earlier (section Underlying Neural
Mechanisms?) of the 100m sprinters who occasionally report
their starting movements even before their conscious awareness
of the sound.
According to Libet, this scenario is well supported by a variety
of evidence indicating the presence of implicit and fast sensory-
motor pathways. Thus, the backward referral process puts the
sequences of events into concise, cognitive frameworks such as
causality and “intention of action.”
Libet’s claims generally injected some controversy into theories
of the philosophy of mind and neuro-philosophy because it may
(or not) endanger what is termed “free will,” which is to some the
critical basis of legal responsibility in a democratic social system.
Apparently, Libet himself suffered from this problem to put sub-
stantial efforts to rescue “freedom” from the implications of his
own findings, relying on a concept of “vetoeing” of own intention
(Libet, 2004), but it did not seem to be very successful. A different
insight to resolve this difficulty actually comes by integrating his
claims above, i.e., the implicit neural correlates preceding a con-
scious percept, and the backward referral of its perceived timing.
Note especially that the backward referral may be considered an
implicit, automatic (stimulus-driven) process of causal attribu-
tion. (Thus, causal attribution may not be always a higher level,
cognitive process).
Finally, a remark on terminology may be necessary here to
avoid a confusion. Throughout the current article, the term “post-
dictive phenomenon” is used strictly in the operational sense,
as repeatedly mentioned above. However, the term “postdiction”
sometimes refers to the “reentry” model or the Libet-type back-
ward referral as the underlying mechanisms. One may want to
make a clear distinction between these two usages.
The next section will be devoted to expounding the details of
this idea of the (generalized) backward referral. Although it may
seem to substantially exceed the specific scope of this paper, the
author feels that this is necessary for a full understanding of the
broad impacts of the findings discussed here.
“SENSE OF AGENCY” AS POSTDICTIVE ATTRIBUTION AND
AN AUTHENTIC ILLUSION
Based on the review and the discussion thus far, we have at least
three lines of reasoning with which to believe in the compatibility
of neuroscientific determinism and the spontaneity/volition of
the human action. We will now examine them one after one.
1. The feeling of free choice may live in the postdictive process, not
in the predictive process.
The overwhelming majority of studies on perception, choice
decision making and action have focused on the neu-
ral mechanisms that precedes and causally determines an
action. However, there is a good possibility that psycho-
logical/neural processes after the decision may significantly
contribute to determining whether a completed decision is
felt as forced or more spontaneous/voluntary. Cognitive dis-
sonance (Festinger, 1957), causal attribution (Heider, 1958),
and choice justification (Staw, 1976) are some of the key-
words in the social psychology literature which are potentially
related. To state this simply, the sense of agency (or a feel-
ing of free choice in a given situation) may well play out
as a postdictive construct. This may be structurally similarly
to the case of conscious perception, as in that case as well,
a percept can be confirmed as “conscious” only when it is
consolidated and reviewed (typically in a response to a ques-
tion on the event). The challenging task for neuroscientists to
account for the neural mechanism underlying the feeling of
agency and “freedom” (and likely visual awareness as well) may
not be accomplished until they shift their attention from the
predictive process to the postdictive process.
2. The feeling of free choice is a matter of content in percep-
tion/cognition. It should be distinguished strictly from the deter-
ministic nature of the neural correlates. For example, a content
of “red” color perception is possible even though the neurons
or the neuronal activity underlying that perception itself is in
no physical sense colored red. When a part of somatosensory
cortex is activated, the pain is not felt there, but rather felt at
the “referred” body part. Likewise, the feeling of free choice
as a content of perception/cognition can be conceivable as a
result of strictly deterministic neuro-physiological sequence
(in the Brain Time). This is analogous to the failure of one-to-
one mapping in the temporal domain between the perceived
sequence of two events and the underlying and corresponding
neural events (section Underlying Neural Mechanisms? and
Libet’s Claims, and the “free will” Endangered?).
As we noted, the perceived timing of an event should be
considered separately from the physical timing of its neural
correlates, particularly on the microscopic time scale (Nishida
and Johnston, 2002). Thus, what is termed the “first-order iso-
morphism” may not hold between the perceived sequence and
the physiological sequences of their neural correlates.
Köhler’s psychophysical isomorphism assumed that an orga-
nized structure of percept (such as relative sizes) has a direct
counterpart in a common structure (relative sizes) of the
dynamic neural field in the brain (Köhler, 1940). He used figu-
ral aftereffect as an example in the space domain. His claim has
been criticized as being “too literally isomorphic,” and is thus
sometimes called the “first-order isomorphism.” At present,
neuroscientists do not believe that the neural correlates of
“a figure A being perceived as larger than another figure B”
should be “the neural circuit encoding A being spatially more
extending than that encoding B.” Indeed, there are notable
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exceptions in which a larger stimulus naturally activate a larger
cortical area (Murray et al., 2006; Schwarzkopf et al., 2011),
but it is very limited to the early visual cortices where a strict
retinotopic mapping is maintained.
Because the skepticism on the first-order isomorphism is
already a commonsense notion in the field, it is rather puzzling
that the majority of scientists and philosophers still believe in
such a first-order (direct) isomorphism in the time domain,
between the temporal sequence of neural correlates and the
time/sequence perception as the contents, especially on the
microscopic scale.
Similarly, a cognitive content (a feeling of agency, spontane-
ity or volition) can be considered separately from its neural
correlates of it. To be more specific, a neural process may
causally determine that a given action is felt voluntary or not
(as the cognitive content), whereas that neural process remains
to be entirely deterministic. This inevitably argues for involve-
ment of postdictive and possibly semantic functions carried by
the neural mechanisms subserving the higher-order perceptual
experiences, with transformations of reality and illusions being
typical for this symbolic level. Note also that being stochastic is
categorically different from being voluntary; hence, the author
would not endorse to some attempts to rely on the stochas-
tic/undeterministic properties of neural dynamics to save free
will and consciousness from determinism.
3. A feeling of free choice is very much like a perceptual illusion, in
that it will not be eliminated by objective knowledge.
Not all types of non-veridical perception are considered per-
ceptual illusions in the “authentic” sense of psychophysics.
For example, various sensory and cognitive hallucinations in
the schizophrenia should not be considered perceptual illu-
sions. Other than the fact that a percept is non-veridical
with regard to the pertinent physical properties, a perceptual
illusion should satisfy the following criteria, traditionally.
(a) It should occur more or less similarly to the vast majority
of neurotypicals. In other words, it should reflect normal,
as opposed to pathological, sensory neural processing.
(b) Objective knowledge (such as “the two lines are of equal
lengths,” “the two disks have the same brightness of gray”
etc.) typically will not eliminate this. Readers may go back
to the flash lag, the “spatial memory updating (with the
Duncker illusion), and many classical geometric illusions
as qualified examples. This is presumably due to a mod-
ular structure of the sensory processing, that is free from
top-down and the other cognitive modules at least partly.
Just as with perceptual illusions, the feeling of “agency” or “free
choice” is unlikely to be “exorcised” by scientific knowledge of the
underlying neural mechanisms (although actually no empirical
data are available). This is similar to color perception in that the
subjective color experiences (as some want to call “qualia”) would
not disappear (as everyone’s intuition tells) when color percep-
tion is fully explained out in neurophysiological terms, starting
from photoreceptors, retinal ganglion cells, the LGN, through to
the primary visual cortex, etc. And this is true even though color
perception is also in a sense an “authentic illusion” because colors
do not exist in the world, they are rather created by interactions
between the physical stimuli and the brain. Likewise, the feel-
ing of agency/free choice can be regarded as one type of robust,
healthy and authentic illusion, for most of which not many peo-
ple are concerned about the degree of compatibility to scientific
determinism.
One may consider this view just as a variation of the “free
will as a cognitive illusion” view proposed by Daniel Wegner
and his colleagues (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002).
According to their view, people can experience conscious will
quite independent of any actual causal connection between their
thoughts and actions. The impression that a thought has caused
an action rests on a causal inference.
Thus at a very crude level, the postdictive construction view
shares a lot with Wegner’s view of free will as a sort of cognitive
illusion. Yet, there are several distinctive differences that would be
noteworthy. Wegner’s view has an obvious implication that free
will is “an illusion, therefore wrong” with regard to the “true”
physical causation. For instance, They make an analogy of the free
will to a magic, in that there are real, and “disguised” causal rela-
tionship. The experience of conscious will in their view is merely
an illusion produced by the perception of an apparent causal
sequence. Apparent mental causation is generated by an interpre-
tive process that is fundamentally separate from the mechanistic
process of real causation.
Whereas we agreed that the free will (together with the sense
of agency) is a mental construction, we take a somewhat dif-
ferent view. The free will reflects a normal function of the
very general processing principle in the brain, i.e., postdictive
construction employing the re-entry, the backward referral and
possibly other mechanisms, which then leads to a normal expe-
rience of the “sense of agency.” In the very same sense as most of
the geometric illusions qualify, it should rather be considered an
authentic, or valid illusion based on mostly automatic, implicit
processes.
Another deviation of our view from Wegner’s “illusion” view
is related to the three criteria they proposed for the interpretive
process to experience free will. Those are (1) priority, (2) consis-
tency, and (3) exclusivity. Among them we would like to impose
a substantial constraint on the first criterion, i.e. the priority. As
obvious from the detailed examination of various postdictive phe-
nomena in the current article, starting from very sensory to highly
cognitive levels, the priority may only be a distinctive feature of
the output (i.e., the percept) of the processing, not the physical
condition for it. As a matter of fact, all the three properties above,
including the consistency and the exclusivity, may be, at least in
some cases, results of postdictive reconstruction.
Whereas the two views are consistent in various aspects, this
single contrast (priority vs. postdiction) may highlight the stark
distinction.
SUMMARY AND GENERAL DISCUSSION
This paper reviewed “postdictive” perceptual phenomena known,
in which a stimulus presented later seems to causally affect
percept of another stimulus presented earlier. Starting from
some classical examples such as backward masking and appar-
ent motion, the list included the cutaneous rabbit effect and the
flash lag effect. Some new studies such as the TMS-triggered
scotoma and the pursuit mislocalization suggest that various
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visual attributes are reorganized in a postdictive fashion to be
consistent with each other, or to be consistent in a causality
framework.
We then extended our discussion into several directions. First,
in terms of underlying mechanisms, four prototypical models
have been considered: the “catch up,” the “reentry,” the “differ-
ent pathway,” and the “memory revision” models. Whereas they
are meant to account for the “postdictive” phenomena but only in
the operational sense above, the mechanism itself does not have
to be postdictive in any sense (perhaps with the exception of the
“reentry” model, and the “backward referral” idea by Benjamin
Libet).
Second, by extending the list of postdictive phenomena to
memory, sensory-motor and higher-level cognition (e.g., “hind-
sight”), one may note that such postdictive reconstruction may be
a general principle of neural computation, ranged from millisec-
onds to months of time scale, from local neuronal interactions
to long-range connectivity, in the complex brain. The operational
definition of the “postdictive phenomenon” can be applicable to
such sensory/cognitive effects across a wide range of time scale,
even though the underlying neural implementations may vary
across the variety of phenomena.
This notion of generic postdiction has a good affinity with the
Bayesian framework, as well as the notion that perceptual aware-
ness is in fact a very brief (possibly iconic) memory. As obvious
in the case of a flicker perception previously mentioned (sec-
tion Underlying Neural Mechanisms?), it is hard to draw a line
between conscious perception and memory. And this is where a
postdictive process operates on the preceding implicit process to
yield a conscious visual percept.
Finally, this structurally the same mechanism may apply to
body movements and its attribution to “free will.” The “sense
of agency” which is the basis of “free will” may be considered a
sort of “authentic illusion” which may hardly evaporate merely
by reductionistic neural account for it.
Closer examinations of the postdictive phenomena may pro-
vide an entirely new and insightful framework to understand
perception, cognition, memory and action. Moreover, it may
add a new angle in the discussion of implicit vs. explicit mental
processes, determinism vs. free will, etc.
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